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Abstract
In this paper, a possibilistic disjunctive logic programming approach for modeling uncertain, in-
complete and inconsistent information is defined. This approach introduces the use of possibilistic
disjunctive clauses which are able to capture incomplete information and incomplete states of a
knowledge base at the same time.
By considering a possibilistic logic program as a possibilistic logic theory, a construction of a
possibilistic logic programming semantic based on answer sets and the proof theory of possibilistic
logic is defined. It shows that this possibilistic semantics for disjunctive logic programs can be char-
acterized by a fixed-point operator. It is also shown that the suggested possibilistic semantics can be
computed by a resolution algorithm and the consideration of optimal refutations from a possibilistic
logic theory.
In order to manage inconsistent possibilistic logic programs, a preference criterion between in-
consistent possibilistic models is defined; in addition, the approach of cuts for restoring consistency
of an inconsistent possibilistic knowledge base is adopted. The approach is illustrated in a medical
scenario.
KEYWORDS: Answer Set Programming, Uncertain Information, Possibilistic Reasoning.
∗ This is a revised and improved version of the papers Semantics for Possibilistic Disjunctive Programs ap-
peared in C. Baral, G. Brewka and J. Schipf (Eds), Ninth International Conference on Logic Programming and
Nonmonotonic Reasoning (LPNMR-07), LNAI 4483. Semantics for Possibilistic Disjunctive Logic programs
which appears in S. Constantini and W. Watson (Eds), Answer Set Programming: Advantage in Theory and
Implementation.
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1 Introduction
Answer Set Programming (ASP) is one of the most successful logic programming ap-
proaches in Non-monotonic Reasoning and Artificial Intelligence applications (Baral 2003;
Gelfond 2008). In (Nicolas et al. 2006), a possibilistic framework for reasoning under un-
certainty was proposed. This framework is a combination between ASP and possibilistic
logic (Dubois et al. 1994).
Possibilistic Logic is based on possibilistic theory in which, at the mathematical level,
degrees of possibility and necessity are closely related to fuzzy sets (Dubois et al. 1994).
Due to the natural properties of possibilistic logic and ASP, Nicolas et al.’s approach allows
us to deal with reasoning that is at the same time non-monotonic and uncertain. Nicolas
et al.’s approach is based on the concept of possibilistic stable model which defines a
semantics for possibilistic normal logic programs.
An important property of possibilistic logic is that it is axiomatizable in the necessity-
valued case (Dubois et al. 1994). This means that there is a formal system (a set of axioms
and inferences rules) such that from any set of possibilistic fomulæ F and for any possi-
bilistic formula Φ, Φ is a logical consequence of F if and only if Φ is derivable from F in
this formal system. A result of this property is that the inference in possibilistic logic can
be managed by both a syntactic approach (axioms and inference rules) and a possibilistic
model theory approach (interpretations and possibilistic distributions).
Equally important to consider is that the answer set semantics inference can also be
characterized as a logic inference in terms of the proof theory of intuitionistic logic and
intermediate logics (Pearce 1999; Osorio et al. 2004). This property suggests that one can
explore extensions of the answer set semantics by considering the inference of different
logics.
Since in (Dubois et al. 1994) an axiomatization of possibilistic logic has been defined,
in this paper we explore the characterization of a possibilistic semantics for capturing pos-
sibilistic logic programs in terms of the proof theory of possibilistic logic and the standard
answer set semantics. A nice feature of this characterization is that it is applicable to dis-
junctive as well as normal possibilistic logic programs, and, with minor modification, to
possibilistic logic programs containing a strong negation operator.
The use of possibilistic disjunctive logic programs allow us to capture incomplete infor-
mation and incomplete states of a knowledge base at the same time. In order to illustrate
the use of possibilistic disjunctive logic programs, let us consider a scenario in which un-
certain and incomplete information is always present. This scenario can be observed in
the process of human organ transplanting. There are several factors that make this process
sophisticated and complex. For instance:
• the transplant acceptance criteria vary ostensibly among transplant teams from the
same geographical area and substantially between more distant transplant teams
(López-Navidad et al. 1997). This means that the acceptance criteria applied in one
hospital could be invalid or at least questionable in another hospital.
• there are lots of factors that make the diagnosis of an organ donor’s disease in
the organ recipient unpredictable. For instance, if an organ donor D has hepati-
tis, then an organ recipient R could be infected by an organ of D. According to
(López-Navidad and Caballero 2003), there are cases in which the infection can oc-
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cur; however, the recipient can spontaneously clear the infection, for example hep-
atitis. This means that an organ donor’s infection can be present or non-present in
the organ recipient. Of course there are infections which can be prevented by treating
the organ recipient post-transplant.
• the clinical state of an organ recipient can be affected by several factors, for example
malfunctions of the graft. This means that the clinical state of an organ recipient can
be stable or unstable after the graft because the graft can have good graft functions,
delayed graft functions and terminal insufficient functions1.
It is important to point out that the transplant acceptance criteria rely on the kind of
organ (kidney, heart, liver, etc.) considered for transplant and the clinical situation of the
potential organ recipients.
Let us consider the particular case of a kind of kidney transplant with organ donors who
have a kind of infection, for example: endocarditis, hepatitis. As already stated, the clinical
situation of the potential organ recipients is relevant in the organ transplant process. Hence
the clinical situation of an organ recipient is denoted by the predicate cs(t, T ), such that
t can be stable, unstable, 0-urgency and T denotes a moment in time. Another important
factor, that is considered, is the state of the organ’s functions. This factor is denoted by
the predicate o(t, T ) such that t can be terminal-insufficient functions, good-graft func-
tions, delayed-graft functions, normal-graft functions and T denotes a moment in time.
Also, the state of an infection in both the organ recipient and the organ donor are consid-
ered, these states are denoted by the predicates r_inf(present, T ) and d_inf(present, T )
respectively so that T denotes a moment in time. The last predicate that is presented is
action(t, T ) such that t can be transplant, wait, post-transplant treatment and T denotes
a moment in time. This predicate denotes the possible actions of a doctor. In Figure 12, a
finite state automata is presented. In this automata, each node represents a possible situa-
tion where an organ recipient can be found and the arrows represent the doctor’s possible
actions. Observe that we are assuming that in the initial state the organ recipient is clini-
cally stable and he does not have an infection; however, he has a kidney whose functions
are terminally insufficient. From the initial state, the doctor’s actions would be either to
perform a kidney transplantat or just wait3.
According to Figure 1, an organ recipient could be found in different situations after a
graft. The organ recipient may require another graft and the state of the infection could be
unpredictable. This situation makes the automata of Figure 1 nondeterministic. Let us con-
sider a couple of extended disjunctive clauses which describe some situations presented in
Figure 1.
1 Usually, when a doctor says that an organ has terminally insufficient functions, it means that there are no clinical
treatments for improving the organ’s functions.
2 This finite state automata was developed under the supervision of Francisco Caballero M. D. Ph. D. from the
Hospital de la Santa Creu I Sant Pau, Barcelona, Spain.
3 In the automata of Figure 1, we are not considering the possibility that there is a waiting list for organs. This
waiting list has different policies for assigning an organ to an organ recipient.
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O:terminal
insufficient func.
Inf: not present
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CS: unstable
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transplant
treatment
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Fig. 1. An automata of states and actions for considering infections in kidney organ trans-
plant.
r_inf(present, T 2)∨ ¬r_inf(present, T 2)← action(transplant, T ),
d_inf(present, T ), T 2 = T + 1.
o(good_graft_funct, T 2)∨ o(delayed_graft_funct, T 2)∨
o(terminal_insufficient_funct, T 2)← action(transplant, T ), T 2 = T + 1.
As syntactic clarification, we want to point out that ¬ is regarded as a strong negation
which is not exactly the negation in classical logic. In fact, any atom negated by strong
negation will be replaced by a new atom as it is done in ASP. This means that a ∨ ¬a
cannot be regarded as a logic tautology.
Continuing with our medical scenario, we can see that the intended meaning of the first
clause is that if the organ donor has an infection, then the infection can be present or non-
present in the organ recipient after the graft, and the intended meaning of the second one
is that the graft’s functions can be: good, delayed and terminal after the graft. Observe
that these clauses are not capturing the uncertainty that is involved in each statement. For
instance, w.r.t. the first clause, one can wish to attach an degree of uncertainty in order
to capture the uncertainty that is involved in this statement — keeping in mind that the
organ recipient can be infected by the infection of the donor’s organ; however, the in-
fection can be spontaneously cleared by the organ recipient as it is the case of hepatitis
(López-Navidad and Caballero 2003).
In logic programming literature, one can find different approaches for representing un-
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certain information (Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992; Ng and Subrahmanian 1992; Lukasiewicz 1998;
Kern-Isberner and Lukasiewicz 2004; van Emden 1986; Rodríguez-Artalejo and Romero-Díaz 2008;
Van-Nieuwenborgh et al. 2007; Fitting 1991; Lakshmanan 1994; Baldwin 1987; Dubois et al. 1991;
Alsinet and Godo 2002; Alsinet and Godo 2000; Alsinet et al. 2008; Nicolas et al. 2006).
Basically, these approaches differ in the underlying notion of uncertainty and how uncer-
tainty values, associated with clauses and facts, are managed. Usually the selection of an
approach for representing uncertain information relies on the kind of information which
has to be represented. In psychology literature, one can find significant observations re-
lated to the presentation of uncertain information. For instance, Tversky and Kahneman
have observed in (Tversky and Kahneman 1982) that people commonly use statements
such as “I think that . . . ”, “chances are . . . ”, “it is probable that . . . ”, “it is plausible that
. . . ”, etc., for supporting their decisions. In fact, many times, experts in a domain, such as
medicine, appeal to their intuition by using these kinds of statements (Fox and Das 2000;
Fox and Modgil 2006). One can observe that these statements have adjectives which quan-
tify the information as a common denominator. These adjectives are for example: probable,
plausible, etc. This suggests that the consideration of labels for the syntactic representation
of uncertain values could help represent uncertain information pervaded by ambiguity.
Since possibilistic logic defines a proof theory in which the strength of a conclusion is
the strength of the weakest argument in its proof, the consideration of an ordered set of
labels for capturing incomplete states of a knowledge base is feasible. The only formal
requirement is that this set of adjectives/labels must be a finite set. For instance, for the
given medical scenario, a transplant coordinator4 can suggest a set of labels in order to
quantify a medical knowledge base and, of course, to define an order between those labels.
By considering those labels, we can have possibilistic clauses as:
probable: r_inf(present, T 2)∨ ¬r_inf(present, T 2)← action(transplant, T ),
d_inf(present, T ), T 2 = T + 1.
Informally speaking, the reading of this clause is: it is probable that if the organ donor has
an infection, then the organ recipient can be infected or not after a graft.
As we can see, possibilistic programs with negation as failure represent a rich class of
logic programs which are especially adapted to automated reasoning when the available
information is pervaded by ambiguity.
In this paper, we extend the work of two earlier papers (Nieves et al. 2007a; Nieves et al. 2007b)
in order to obtain a simple logic characterization of a possibilistic logic programming se-
mantics for capturing possibilistic programs; this semantics is applicable to disjunctive as
well as normal logic programs. As we have already mentioned, the construction of the
possibilistic semantics is based on the proof theory of possibilistic logic. Following this
approach:
• We define the inference PL. This inference takes as references the standard defi-
nition of the answer set semantics and the inference ⊢PL which corresponds to the
inference of possibilistic logic.
4 A transplant coordinator is an expert in all of the processes of transplants (López-Navidad et al. 1997).
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• The possibilistic semantics is defined in terms of a syntactic reduction, PL and the
concept of i-greatest set.
• Since the inference of possibilistic logic is computable by a generalization of the
classical resolution rule, it is shown that the defined possibilistic semantics is com-
putable by inferring optimal refutations.
• By considering the principle of partial evaluation, it is shown that the given possi-
bilistic semantics can be characterized by a possibilistic partial evaluation operator.
• Finally, since the possibilistic logic uses α-cuts to manage inconsistent possibilistic
knowledge bases, an approach of cuts for restoring consistency of an inconsistent
possibilistic knowledge base is adopted.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows: In §2 we give all the background and nec-
essary notation. In §3, the syntax of our possibilistic framework is presented. In §4, the
semantics for capturing the possibilistic logic programs is defined. Also it is shown that
this semantics is computable by considering a possibilistic resolution rule and partial eval-
uation. In §5, some criteria for managing inconsistent possibilistic logic programs are de-
fined. In §6, we present a small discussion w.r.t. related approaches to our work. Finally, in
the last section, we present our conclusions and future work.
2 Background
In this section we introduce the necessary terminology and relevant definitions in order to
have a self-contained document. We assume that the reader is familiar with basic concepts
of classic logic, logic programming and lattices.
2.1 Lattices and order
We start by defining some fundamental definitions of lattice theory (see (Davey and Priestly 2002)
for more details).
Definition 1
Let Q be a set. An order (or partial order) on Q is a binary relation ≤ on Q such that, for
all x, y, z ∈ Q,
(i) x ≤ x
(ii) x ≤ y and y ≤ x imply x = y
(iii) x ≤ y and y ≤ z imply x ≤ z
These conditions are referred to, respectively, as reflexivity, antisymmetry and transitivity.
A setQ equipped with an order relation≤ is said to be an ordered set (or partial ordered
set). It will be denoted by (Q,≤).
Definition 2
Let (Q,≤) be an ordered set and let S ⊆ Q. An element x ∈ Q is an upper bound of S
if s ≤ x for all s ∈ S. A lower bound is defined dually. The set of all upper bounds of
S is denoted by Su (read as ‘S upper’) and the set of all lower bounds by Sl (read as ‘S
lower’).
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If Su has a minimum element x, then x is called the least upper bound (LUB) of S.
Equivalently, x is the least upper bound of S if
(i) x is an upper bound of S, and
(ii) x ≤ y for all upper bound y of S.
The least upper bound of S exists if and only if there exists x ∈ Q such that
(∀y ∈ Q)[((∀s ∈ S)s ≤ y)⇐⇒ x ≤ y],
and this characterizes theLUB of S. Dually, if Sl has a greatest element, x, then x is called
the greatest lower bound (GLB) of S. Since the least element and the greatest element are
unique, LUB and GLB are unique when they exist.
The least upper bound of S is called the supremum of S and it is denoted by sup S; the
greatest lower bound of S is called the infimum of S and it is denoted by inf S.
Definition 3
Let (Q,≤) be a non-empty ordered set.
(i) If sup{x, y} and inf{x, y} exist for all x, y ∈ Q, then Q is called lattice.
(ii) If sup S and inf S exist for all S ⊆ Q, then Q is called a complete lattice.
Example 1
Let us consider the set of labels Q := {Certain, Confirmed, Probable, P lausible,
Supported, Open}5 and let  be a partial order such that the following set of rela-
tions holds: {Open  Supported, Supported  Plausible, Supported  Probable,
Probable  Confirmed, Plausible  Confirmed, Confirmed  Certain}. A
graphic representation of S according to  is showed in Figure 2. It is not difficult to see
that (Q,) is a lattice and further it is a complete lattice.
2.2 Logic programs: Syntax
The language of a propositional logic has an alphabet consisting of
(i) proposition symbols: ⊥, p0, p1, ...
(ii) connectives : ∨,∧,←,¬, not
(iii) auxiliary symbols : ( , )
in which ∨,∧,← are binary-place connectives, ¬, not are unary-place connective and
⊥ is zero-ary connective. The proposition symbols and ⊥ stand for the indecomposable
propositions, which we call atoms, or atomic propositions. Atoms negated by ¬ will be
called extended atoms.
5 This set of labels was taken from (Fox and Modgil 2006). In that paper, the authors argue that we can construct
a set of labels (they call those: modalities) in a way that this set provides a simple scale for ordering the claims
of our beliefs. We will use this kind of labels for quantifying the degree of uncertainty of a statement.
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Fig. 2. A graphic representation of a lattice where the following relations holds:
{Open  Supported, Supported  Plausible Supported  Probable, Probable 
Confirmed, Plausible  Confirmed , Confirmed  Certain}.
Remark 1
We will use the concept of atom without paying attention to whether it is an extended atom
or not.
The negation sign ¬ is regarded as the so called strong negation by the ASP’s literature
and the negation not as the negation as failure. A literal is an atom, a, or the negation of
an atom not a. Given a set of atoms {a1, ..., an}, we write not {a1, ..., an} to denote the
set of literals {not a1, ..., not an}. An extended disjunctive clause, C, is denoted:
a1 ∨ . . . ∨ am ← am+1, . . . , aj , not aj+1, . . . , not an
in which m ≥ 0, n ≥ 0, m + n > 0, each ai is an atom6. When n = 0 and m > 0 the
clause is an abbreviation of a1∨ . . .∨am ←; clauses of these forms are some times written
just as a1 ∨ . . . ∨ am. When m = 0 the clause is an abbreviation of:
← a1, . . . , aj, not aj+1, . . . , not an
Clauses of this form are called constraints (the rest, non-constraint clauses). An extended
disjunctive program P is a finite set of extended disjunctive clauses. By LP , we denote the
set of atoms in the language of P .
Sometimes we denote an extended disjunctive clause C by A ← B+, not B−, A con-
tains all the head literals, B+ contains all the positive body literals and B− contains all the
negative body literals. When B− = ∅, the clause is called positive disjunctive clause. A set
of positive disjunctive clauses is called a positive disjunctive logic program. When A is a
singleton set, the clause can be regarded as a normal clause. A normal logic program is a
finite set of normal clauses. Finally, when A is a singleton set and B− = ∅, the clause can
6 Notice that these atoms can be extended atoms.
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also be regarded as a definite clause. A finite set of definite clauses is called a definite logic
program.
We will manage the strong negation (¬), in our logic programs, as it is done in ASP
(Baral 2003). Basically, each extended atom¬a is replaced by a new atom symbol a′ which
does not appear in the language of the program. For instance, let P be the normal program:
a← q. q.
¬q ← r. r.
Then replacing each extended atom by a new atom symbol, we will have:
a← q. q.
q′ ← r. r.
In order not to allow models with complementary atoms, that is q and ¬q, a constraint
of the form ← q, q′ is usually added to the logic program. In our approach, this constraint
can be omitted in order to allow models with complementary atoms. In fact, the user could
add/omit this constraint without losing generality.
Formulæ are constructed as usual in classic logic by the connectives: ∨,∧,←,∼,⊥. A
theory T is a finite set of formulæ. By LT , we denote the set of atoms that occur in T.
When we treat a logic program as a theory,
• each negative literal not a is replaced by∼ a such that∼ is regarded as the negation
in classic logic.
• each constraint ← a1, . . . , aj, not aj+1, . . . , not an is rewritten according to the
formula a1 ∧ · · · ∧ aj∧ ∼ aj+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∼ an → ⊥.
Given a set of proposition symbols S and a theory Γ in a logicX . If Γ ⊢X S if and only
if ∀s ∈ S Γ ⊢X s.
2.3 Interpretations and models
In this section, we define some relevant concepts w.r.t. semantics. The first basic concept
that we introduce is interpretation.
Definition 4
Let T be a theory, an interpretation I is a mapping from LT to {0, 1} meeting the condi-
tions:
1. I(a ∧ b) = min{I(a), I(b)},
2. I(a ∨ b) = max{I(a), I(b)},
3. I(a← b) = 0 if and only if I(b) = 1 and I(a) = 0,
4. I(∼ a) = 1− I(a),
5. I(⊥) = 0.
It is standard to provide interpretations only in terms of a mapping from LT to {0, 1}.
Moreover, it is easy to prove that this mapping is unique by virtue of the definition by recur-
sion (van Dalen 1994). Also, it is standard to use sets of atoms to represent interpretations.
The set corresponds exactly to those atoms that evaluate to 1.
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An interpretation I is called a (2-valued) model of the logic program P if and only if
for each clause c ∈ P , I(c) = 1. A theory is consistent if it admits a model, otherwise
it is called inconsistent. Given a theory T and a formula ϕ, we say that ϕ is a logical
consequence of T , denoted by T |= ϕ, if every model I of T holds that I(ϕ) = 1. It is a
well known result that T |= ϕ if and only if T ∪ {∼ ϕ} is inconsistent (van Dalen 1994).
We say that a model I of a theory T is a minimal model if a model I ′ of T different from
I such that I ′ ⊂ I does not exist. Maximal models are defined in the analogous form.
2.4 Logic programming semantics
In this section, the answer set semantics is presented. This semantics represents a two-
valued semantics approach.
2.4.1 Answer set semantics
By using ASP, it is possible to describe a computational problem as a logic program whose
answer sets correspond to the solutions of the given problem. It represents one of the most
successful approaches of non-monotonic reasoning of the last two decades (Baral 2003).
The number of applications of this approach have increased due to the efficient implemen-
tations of the answer set solvers that exist.
The answer set semantics was first defined in terms of the so called Gelfond-Lifschitz
reduction (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) and it is usually studied in the context of syntax
dependent transformations on programs. The following definition of an answer set for ex-
tended disjunctive logic programs generalizes the definition presented in (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988)
and it was presented in (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991): Let P be any extended disjunctive
logic program. For any set S ⊆ LP , let PS be the positive program obtained from P by
deleting
(i) each rule that has a formula not a in its body with a ∈ S, and then
(ii) all formulæ of the form not a in the bodies of the remaining rules.
Clearly PS does not contain not (this means that PS is either a positive disjunctive logic
program or a definite logic program), hence S is called an answer set of P if and only if S is
a minimal model of PS . In order to illustrate this definition, let us consider the following
example:
Example 2
Let us consider the set of atoms S := {b} and the following normal logic program P :
b← not a. b.
c← not b. c← a.
We can see that PS is:
b. c← a.
Notice that this program has three models: {b}, {b, c} and {a, b, c}. Since the minimal
model among these models is {b}, we can say that S is an answer set of P .
In the answer set definition, we will normally omit the restriction that if S has a pair of
complementary literals then S := LP . This means that we allow for the possibility that
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an answer set could have a pair of complementary atoms. For instance, let us consider the
program P :
a. ¬a. b.
then, the only answer set of this program is : {a,¬a, b}. In Section 5, the inconsistency in
possibilistic programs is discussed.
It is worth mentioning that in literature there are several forms for handling an inconsis-
tency program (Baral 2003). For instance, by applying the original definition (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991)
the only answer set of P is: {a,¬a, b,¬b}. On the other hand, the DLV system (DLV 1996)
returns no models if the program is inconsistent.
2.5 Possibilistic Logic
Since in our approach is based on the proof theory of possibilistic logic, in this section, we
present an axiomation of possibilistic logic for the case of necessity-valued formulæ.
Possibilistic logic is a weighted logic introduced and developed in the mid-1980s, in the
setting of artificial intelligence, with the goal of developing a simple yet rigorous approach
to automated reasoning from uncertain or prioritized incomplete information. Possibilistic
logic is especially adapted to automated reasoning when the available information is per-
vaded by ambiguities. In fact, possibilistic logic is a natural extension of classical logic in
which the notion of total order/partial order is embedded in the logic.
Possibilistic Logic is based on possibility theory. Possibilistic theory, as its name im-
plies, deals with the possible rather than probable values of a variable with possibility
being a matter of degree. One merit of possibilistic theory is at one and the same time to
represent imprecision (in the form of fuzzy sets) and quantity uncertainty (through the pair
of numbers that measure possibility and necessity).
Our study in possibilistic logic is devoted to a fragment of possibilistic logic, in which
knowledge bases are only necessity-quantified statements. A necessity-valued formula is a
pair (ϕ α) in which ϕ is a classical logic formula and α ∈ (0, 1] is a positive number. The
pair (ϕ α) expresses that the formula ϕ is certain at least to the level α, that is N(ϕ) ≥ α,
in which N is a necessity measure modeling our possibly incomplete state knowledge
(Dubois et al. 1994). α is not a probability (like it is in probability theory), but it induces
a certainty (or confidence) scale. This value is determined by the expert providing the
knowledge base. A necessity-valued knowledge base is then defined as a finite set (that is
to say a conjunction) of necessity-valued formulæ.
The following properties hold w.r.t. necessity-valued formulæ:
N(ϕ ∧ ψ) = min({N(ϕ), N(ψ)}) (1)
N(ϕ ∨ ψ) ≥ max({N(ϕ), N(ψ)}) (2)
if ϕ ⊢ ψ then N(ψ) ≥ N(ϕ) (3)
Dubois et al., in (Dubois et al. 1994) introduced a formal system for necessity-valued
logic which is based on the following axioms schemata (propositional case):
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(A1) (ϕ→ (ψ → ϕ) 1)
(A2) ((ϕ→ (ψ → ξ))→ ((ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ξ)) 1)
(A3) ((¬ϕ→ ¬ψ)→ ((¬ϕ→ ψ)→ ϕ) 1)
Inference rules:
(GMP) (ϕ α), (ϕ→ ψ β) ⊢ (ψ min{α, β})
(S) (ϕ α) ⊢ (ϕ β) if β ≤ α
According to Dubois et al., in (Dubois et al. 1994), basically we need a complete lat-
tice to express the levels of uncertainty in Possibilistic Logic. Dubois et al. extended the
axioms schemata and the inference rules for considering partially ordered sets. We shall
denote by ⊢PL the inference under Possibilistic Logic without paying attention to whether
the necessity-valued formulæ are using a totally ordered set or a partially ordered set for
expressing the levels of uncertainty.
The problem of inferring automatically the necessity-value of a classical formula from
a possibilistic base was solved by an extended version of resolution for possibilistic logic
(see (Dubois et al. 1994) for details).
One of the main principles of possibilistic logic is that:
Remark 2
The strength of a conclusion is the strength of the weakest argument used in its proof.
According to Dubois and Prade (Dubois and Prade 2004), the contribution of possibilis-
tic logic setting is to relate this principle (measuring the validity of an inference chain
by its weakest link) to fuzzy set-based necessity measures in the framework of Zadeh’s
possibilistic theory, since the following pattern then holds:
N(∼ p ∨ q) ≥ α and N(p) ≥ β imply N(q) ≥ min(α, β)
This interpretive setting provides a semantic justification to the claim that the weight at-
tached to a conclusion should be the weakest among the weights attached to the formulæ
involved in the derivation.
3 Syntax
In this section, the general syntax for possibilistic disjunctive logic programs will be pre-
sented. This syntax is based on the standard syntax of extended disjunctive logic programs
(see Section 2.2).
We start by defining some concepts for managing the possibilistic values of a possibilis-
tic knowledge base7. We want to point out that in the whole document only finite lattices
are considered. This assumption was made based on the recognition that in real applica-
tions we will rarely have an infinite set of labels for expressing the incomplete state of a
knowledge base.
A possibilistic atom is a pair p = (a, q) ∈ A×Q, in whichA is a finite set of atoms and
7 Some concepts presented in this section extend some terms presented in (Nicolas et al. 2006).
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(Q,≤) is a lattice. The projection ∗ to a possibilistic atom p is defined as follows: p∗ = a.
Also given a set of possibilistic atoms S, ∗ over S is defined as follows: S∗ = {p∗|p ∈ S}.
Let (Q,≤) be a lattice. A possibilistic disjunctive clause R is of the form:
α : A ← B+, not B−
in which α ∈ Q and A ← B+, not B− is an extended disjunctive clause as defined in
Section 2.2. The projection ∗ for a possibilistic clause is R∗ = A ← B+, not B−. On the
other hand, the projection n for a possibilistic clause is n(R) = α. This projection denotes
the degree of necessity captured by the certainty level of the information described by R.
A possibilistic constraint C is of the form:
⊤Q : ← B
+, not B−
in which ⊤Q is the top of the lattice (Q,≤) and ← B+, not B− is a constraint as defined
in Section 2.2. The projection ∗ for a possibilistic constraint C is: C∗ = ← B+, not B−.
Observe that the possibilistic constraints have the top of the lattice (Q,≤) as an uncer-
tain value, this assumption is due to the fact that similar a constraint in standard ASP, the
purpose of a possibilistic constraint is to eliminate possibilistic models. Hence, it can be
assumed that there is no doubt about the veracity of the information captured by a pos-
sibilistic constraint. However, as in standard ASP, one can define possibilistic constraints
of the form: α : x ← B+, not B−, not x such that x is an atom which is not used in
any other possibilistic clause and α ∈ Q. This means that the user can define possibilistic
constraints with different levels of certainty.
A possibilistic disjunctive logic program P is a tuple of the form 〈(Q,≤), N〉, in which
N is a finite set of possibilistic disjunctive clauses and possibilistic constraints. The gen-
eralization of ∗ over P is as follows: P ∗ = {r∗|r ∈ N}. Notice that P ∗ is an extended
disjunctive program. When P ∗ is a normal program, P is called a possibilistic normal pro-
gram. Also, when P ∗ is a positive disjunctive program, P is called a possibilistic positive
logic program and so on. A given set of possibilistic disjunctive clauses {γ, . . . , γ} is also
represented as {γ; . . . ; γ} to avoid ambiguities with the use of the comma in the body of
the clauses.
Given a possibilistic disjunctive logic program P = 〈(Q,≤), N〉, we define the α-cut
and the strict α-cut of P , denoted respectively by Pα and Pα, by
Pα = 〈(Q,≤), Nα〉 such that Nα = {c|c ∈ N and n(c) ≥ α}
Pα = 〈(Q,≤), Nα〉 such that Nα = {c|c ∈ N and n(c) > α}
Example 3
In order to illustrate a possibilistic program, let us go back to our scenario described in
Section 1. Let (Q,) be the lattice of Figure 2 such that the relation A  B means that A
is less possible than B. The possibilistic program P := 〈(Q,), N〉 will be the following
set of possibilistic clauses:
It is probable that if the organ donor has an infection, then the organ recipient can be in-
fected or not after a graft:
probable: r_inf(present, T 2)∨ ¬r_inf(present, T 2)← action(transplant, T ),
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d_inf(present, T ), T 2 = T + 1.
It is confirmed that the organ’s functions can be: good, delayed and terminal after a graft.
confirmed: o(good_graft_funct, T 2)∨ o(delayed_graft_funct, T 2)∨
o(terminal_insufficient_funct, T 2)← action(transplant, T ), T 2 = T + 1.
It is confirmed that if the organ’s functions are terminally insufficient then a transplanting
is necessary.
confirmed: action(transplant, T )← o(terminal_insufficient_funct, T ).
It is plausible that the clinical situation of the organ recipient can be stable if the functions
of the graft are good.
plausible: cs(stable, T )← o(good_graft_funct, T ).
It is plausible that the clinical situation of the organ recipient can be unstable if the func-
tions of the graft are delayed.
plausible: cs(unstable, T )← o(delayed_graft_funct, T ).
It is plausible that the clinical situation of the organ recipient can be of 0-urgency if the
functions of the graft are terminally insufficient after the graft.
plausible: cs(0-urgency, T 2)← o(terminal_insufficient_funct, T 2),
action(transplant, T ), T 2 = T + 1.
It is certain that the doctor cannot do two actions at the same time.
certain: ← action(transplant, T ), action(wait, T ).
It is certain that a transplant cannot be done if the organ recipient is dead.
certain: ← action(transplant, T ), cs(dead, T ).
The initial state of the automata of Figure 1 is captured by the following possibilistic
clauses:
certain: d_inf(present, 0).
certain: ¬r_inf(present, 0).
certain: o(terminal_insufficient_funct, 0).
certain: cs(stable, 0).
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4 Semantics
In §3, the syntax for any possibilistic disjunctive program was introduced, Now, in this
section, a semantics for capturing these programs is studied. This semantics will be defined
in terms of the standard definition of the answer set semantics (§2.4.1) and the proof theory
of possibilistic logic (§2.5).
As sets of atoms are considered as interpretations, two basic operations between sets of
possibilistic atoms are defined; also a relation of order between them is defined: Given a
finite set of atoms A and a lattice (Q,≤), PS ′ = 2A×Q and
PS = PS ′ \ {A|A ∈ PS such that x ∈ A and Cardinality({(x, α)|(x, α) ∈ A}) ≥ 2}8
Observe that PS ′ is the finite set of all the possibilistic atom sets induced by A and Q.
Informally speaking, PS is the subset of PS ′ such that each set of PS has no atoms with
different uncertain value.
Definition 5
Let A be a finite set of atoms and (Q,≤) be a lattice. ∀A,B ∈ PS, we define.
A ⊓B = {(x,GLB({α, β})|(x, α) ∈ A ∧ (x, β) ∈ B}
A ⊔B = {(x, α)|(x, α) ∈ A and x /∈ B∗} ∪
{(x, α)|x /∈ A∗ and (x, α) ∈ B} ∪
{(x,LUB({α, β})|(x, α) ∈ A and (x, β) ∈ B}.
A ⊑ B ⇐⇒ A∗ ⊆ B∗, and ∀x, α, β, (x, α) ∈ A ∧ (x, β) ∈ B
then α ≤ β.
This definition is almost the same as Definition 7 presented in (Nicolas et al. 2006). The
main difference is that in Definition 7 from (Nicolas et al. 2006) the operations ⊓ and ⊔
are defined in terms of the operators min and max instead of the operators GLB and LUB.
Hence, the following proposition is a direct result of Proposition 6 of (Nicolas et al. 2006).
Proposition 1
(PS,⊑) is a complete lattice.
Before moving on, let us define the concept of i-greatest set w.r.t. PS as follows: Given
M ∈ PS,M is an i-greatest set in PS iff ∄M ′ ∈ PS such that M ⊑M ′. For instance, let
PS = {{(a, 1)}, {(a, 2)}, {(a, 2), (b, 1)}, {(a, 2), (b, 2)}}. One can see that PS has two
i-greatest sets: {(a, 2)} and {(a, 2), (b, 2)}. The concept of i-greatest set will play a key
role in the definition of possibilistic answer sets in order to infer possibilistic answer sets
with optimal certainty values.
4.1 Possibilistic answer set semantics
Similar to the definition of answer set semantics, the possibilistic answer set semantics
is defined in terms of a syntactic reduction. This reduction is inspired by the Gelfond-
Lifschitz reduction.
8 Cardinality is a function which returns the cardinality of a set.
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Definition 6 (Reduction PM )
Let P = 〈(Q,≤), N〉 be a possibilistic disjunctive logic program, M be a set of atoms. P
reduced by M is the positive possibilistic disjunctive logic program:
PM := {(n(r) : A∩M ← B
+)|r ∈ N,A∩M 6= ∅, B− ∩M = ∅,B+ ⊆M}
in which r∗ is of the form A ← B+, not B−.
Notice that (P ∗)M is not exactly equal to the Gelfond-Lifschitz reduction. For instance,
let us consider the following programs:
P : P{c,b} : (P
∗){c,b} :
α1 : a ∨ b. α1 : b. a ∨ b.
α2 : c← not a. α2 : c. c.
α3 : c← not b.
The program P{c,b} is obtained from P and {c, b} by applying Definition 6 and the pro-
gram (P ∗){c,b} is obtained from P ∗ and {c, b} by applying the Gelfond-Lifschitz reduc-
tion. Observe that the reduction of Definition 6 removes from the head of the possibilistic
disjunctive clauses any atom which does not belong to M . As we will see in Section 4.2,
this property will be helpful for characterizing the possibilistic answer set in terms of a
fixed-point operator. It is worth mentioning that the reduction (P ∗)M also has a different
effect from the Gelfond-Lifschitz reduction in the class of normal programs. This differ-
ence is illustrated in the following programs:
P : P{a} : (P
∗){a} :
α1 : a← not b. α1 : a. a.
α2 : a← b. a← b.
α3 : b← c. b← c.
Example 4
Continuing with our medical scenario described in the introduction, let P be a ground in-
stance of the possibilistic program presented in Example 3:
probable: r_inf(present, 1) ∨ no_r_inf(present, 1)← action(transplant, 0),
d_inf(present, 0).
confirmed: o(good_graft_funct, 1) ∨ o(delayed_graft_funct, 1)∨
o(terminal_insufficient_funct, 1)← action(transplant, 0).
confirmed: action(transplant, 0)← o(terminal_insufficient_funct, 0).
plausible: cs(stable, 1)← o(good_graft_funct, 1).
plausible: cs(unstable, 1)← o(delayed_graft_funct, 1).
plausible: cs(0-urgency, 1)← o(terminal_insufficient_funct, 1),
action(transplant, 0).
certain: ← action(transplant, 0), action(wait, 0).
certain: ← action(transplant, 0), cs(dead, 0).
certain: d_inf(present, 0).
certain: no_r_inf(present, 0).
Semantics for Possibilistic Disjunctive Programs 17
certain: o(terminal_insufficient_funct, 0).
certain: cs(stable, 0).
Observe that the variables of time T and T 2 were instantiated with the values 0 and 1 re-
spectively; moreover, observe that the atoms¬r_inf(present, 0) and¬r_inf(present, 1)
were replaced byno_r_inf(present, 0) andno_r_inf(present, 1) respectively. This change
was applied in order to manage the strong negation, ¬ .
Now, let S be the following possibilistic set:
S = {(d_inf(present, 0), certain), (no_r_inf(present, 0), certain),
(o(terminal_insufficient_funct, 0), certain), (cs(stable, 0), certain),
(action(transplant, 0), confirmed), (o(good_graft_funct, 1), confirmed),
(cs(stable, 1), plausible), (no_r_inf(present, 1), probable)}.
One can see that PS∗ is:
probable: no_r_inf(present, 1)← action(transplant, 0), d_inf(present, 0).
confirmed: o(good_graft_funct, 1)← action(transplant, 0).
confirmed: action(transplant, 0)← o(terminal_insufficient_funct, 0).
plausible: cs(stable, 1)← o(good_graft_funct, 1).
plausible: cs(unstable, 1)← o(delayed_graft_funct, 1).
plausible: cs(0-urgency, 1)← o(terminal_insufficient_funct, 1),
action(transplant, 0).
certain: ← action(transplant, 0), action(wait, 0).
certain: ← action(transplant, 0), cs(dead, 0).
certain: d_inf(present, 0).
certain: no_r_inf(present, 0).
certain: o(terminal_insufficient_funct, 0).
certain: cs(stable, 0).
Once a possibilistic logic programP has been reduced by a set of possibilistic atomsM ,
it is possible to test whetherM is a possibilistic answer set of the program P . For this end,
we consider a syntactic approach; meaning that it is based on the proof theory of possibilis-
tic logic. Let us remember that the possibilistic logic is axiomatizable (Dubois et al. 1994);
hence, the inference in possibilistic logic can be managed by both a syntactic approach
(axioms and inference rules) and a possibilistic model theory approach (interpretations
and possibilistic distributions).
Since the certainty value of a possibilistic disjunctive clause can belong to a partially
ordered set, the inference rules of possibilistic logic introduced in Section 2.5 have to be
generalized in terms of bounds. The generalization of GMP and S is defined as follows:
(GMP*) (ϕ α), (ϕ→ ψ β) ⊢ (ψ GLB{α, β})
(S*) (ϕ α), (ϕ β) ⊢ (ϕ γ), where γ ≤ GLB{α, β}
Observe that these inference rules are essentially the same as the inference rules introduced
in Section 2.5; however, they are defined in terms of GLB to lead with certainty values
which are not comparable (in Example 6 these inference rules are illustrated).
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Once we have defined GMP ∗ and S∗, the inference PL is defined as follows:
Definition 7
Let P = 〈(Q,≤), N〉 be a possibilistic disjunctive logic program and M ∈ PS.
• We write P PL M when M∗ is an answer set of P ∗ and PM∗ ⊢PL M .
One can see that PL is defining a joint inference between the answer set semantics
and the proof theory of possibilistic logic. Let us consider the following example.
Example 5
Let P = 〈(Q,≤), N〉 be a possibilistic disjunctive logic program such that Q = {0.1, . . . ,
0.9}, ≤ denotes the standard relation in real numbers and N is the following set of possi-
bilistic clauses:
0.6 : a ∨ b. 0.4 : a← not b. 0.8 : b← not a.
It is easy to see that P ∗ has two answer sets: {a} and {b}. On the other hand, one can
see that P{a} ⊢PL {(a, 0.6)}, P{a} ⊢PL {(a, 0.4)}, P{b} ⊢PL {(b, 0.6)} and P{b} ⊢PL
{(b, 0.8)}. This means that P PL {(a, 0.6)}, P PL {(a, 0.4)}, P PL {(b, 0.6)} and
P PL {(b, 0.8)}.
The basic idea of PL is to identify candidate sets of possibilistic atoms in order to con-
sider them as possibilistic answer sets. The following proposition formalizes an important
property of PL.
Proposition 2
Let P = 〈(Q,≤), N〉 be a possibilistic disjunctive logic program and M1,M2 ∈ PS such
that M∗1 =M∗2 . If P PL M1 and P PL M2, then P PL M1 ⊔M2.
In this proposition, since M1 andM2 are two sets of possibilistic atoms, LUB is instan-
tiated in terms of ⊑. By considering PL and the concept of i-greatest set, a possibilistic
answer set is defined as follows:
Definition 8 (A possibilistic answer set)
Let P = 〈(Q,≤), N〉 be a possibilistic disjunctive logic program and M be a set of possi-
bilistic atoms such that M∗ is an answer set of P ∗. M is a possibilistic answer set of P iff
M is an i-greatest set in PS such that P PL M .
Essentially, a possibilistic answer set is an i-greatest set which is inferred by PL.
In other words, a possibilistic answer set is an answer set with optimal certainty values.
For instance, in Example 5, we saw that P PL {(a, 0.6)}, P PL {(a, 0.4)}, P PL
{(b, 0.6)} andP PL {(b, 0.8)}; however, {(a, 0.4)} and {(b, 0.6)} are not i-greatest sets.
This means that the possibilistic answer sets of the possibilistic program P of Example 5
are: {(a, 0.6)} and {(b, 0.8)}.
Example 6
Let P be again the possibilistic program of Example 3 and S be the possibilistic set of
atoms introduced in Example 4.
One can see that S∗ is an answer set of the extended disjunctive program P ∗. Hence, in
order to prove that P PL S, we have to verify that PS∗ ⊢PL S. This means that for each
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possibilistic atom p ∈ S, PS∗ ⊢PL p. It is clear that
PS∗ ⊢PL {(d_inf(present, 0), certain), (no_r_inf(present, 0), certain),
(o(terminal_insufficient_funct, 0), certain),
(cs(stable, 0), certain)}
Now let us prove (cs(stable, 1), plausible) from PS∗ .
Premises from PS∗
1. o(terminal_insufficient_funct, 0) certain
2. o(terminal_insufficient_funct, 0)→ action(transplant, 0) confirmed
3. action(transplant, 0)→ o(good_graft_funct, 1) confirmed
4. o(good_graft_funct, 1)→ cs(stable, 1) plausible
From 1 and 2 by GMP*
5. action(transplant, 0) confirmed
From 3 and 5 by GMP*
6. o(good_graft_funct, 1) confirmed
From 4 and 6 by GMP*
7. cs(stable, 1). plausible
In this proof, we can also see the inference of the possibilistic atom (action(transplant, 0),
confirmed). The proof of the possibilistic atom (no_r_inf(present, 1), probable) is
similar to the proof of the possibilistic atom (cs(stable, 1), plausible). Therefore,PS∗ ⊢PL
S is true. Notice that a possibilistic set S′ such that S′ 6= S, P(S′)∗ ⊢PL S′ and S ⊑ S′
does not exists; hence, S is an i-greatest set. Then, S is a possibilistic answer set of P .
By considering the possibilistic answer set S, what can we conclude about our medical
scenario from S? We can conclude that if it is confirmed that a transplant is performed
on a donor with an infection, it is probable that the recipient will not be infected after
the transplant; moreover it is plausible that he will be stable. It is worth mentioning that
this optimistic conclusion is just one of the possible scenarios that we can infer from the
program P . In fact, the program P has six possibilistic answer sets in which we can find
pessimistic scenarios such as it is probable that the recipient will be infected by the organ
donor’s infection and; moreover, it is confirmed that the recipient needs another transplant.
Now, let us identify some properties of the possibilistic answer set semantics. First,
observe that there is an important condition w.r.t. the definition of a possibilistic answer
set which is introduced by PL: a possibilistic set S cannot be a possibilistic answer set
of a possibilistic logic program P if S∗ is not an answer set of the extended logic program
P ∗. This condition guarantees that any clause of P ∗ is satisfied by S∗. For instance, let us
consider the possibilistic logic program P :
0.4 : a. 0.6 : b.
and the possibilistic set S = {(a, 0.4)}. We can see that PS∗ ⊢PL S; however,S∗ is not an
answer set of P ∗. Therefore, P PL S is false. Then S could not be a possibilistic answer
set of P . This suggests, a direct relationship between the possibilistic answer semantics
and the answer set semantics.
Proposition 3
20 J. C. Nieves, M. Osorio, and U. Cortés
Let P be a possibilistic disjunctive logic program. If M is a possibilistic answer set of P
then M∗ is an answer set of P ∗.
When all the possibilistic clauses of a possibilistic program P have the same certainly
level, the answer sets of P ∗ can be directly generalized to the possibilistic answer sets of
P .
Proposition 4
Let P = 〈(Q,≤), N〉 be a possibilistic disjunctive logic program and α be a fixed element
of Q. If ∀r ∈ P , n(r) = α and M ′ is an answer set of P ∗, then M := {(a, α)|a ∈M ′} is
a possibilistic answer set of P .
For the class of possibilistic normal logic programs which are defined with a totally
ordered set, our definition of possibilistic answer set is closely related to the definition
of a possibilistic stable model presented in (Nicolas et al. 2006). In fact, both semantics
coincide.
Proposition 5
Let P := 〈(Q,≤), N〉 be a possibilistic normal program such that (Q,≤) is a totally
ordered set and LP has no extended atoms. M is a possibilistic answer set of P if and only
if M is a possibilistic stable model of P .
To prove that the possibilistic answer set semantics is computable, we will present an
algorithm for computing possibilistic answer sets. With this in mind, let us remember that
a classical resolvent is defined as follows: Assume that C and D are two clauses in their
disjunctive form such that C = a∨ l1 ∨ · · · ∨ ln and D =∼ a∨ ll1 ∨ · · · ∨ llm. The clause
l1 ∨ · · · ∨ ln ∨ ll1 ∨ · · · ∨ llm is called a resolvent of C and D w.r.t. a. Thus clauses C and
D have a resolvent in case a literal a exists such that a appears in C and ∼ a appears in D
(or conversely).
Now, let us consider a straightforward generalization of the possibilistic resolution rule
introduced in (Dubois et al. 1994):
(R) (c1 α1)(c2 α2) ⊢ (R(c1, c2) GLB({α1, α2}))
in whichR(c1, c2) is any classical resolvent of c1 and c2 such that c1 and c2 are disjunctions
of literals. It is worth mentioning that it is easy to transform any possibilistic disjunctive
logic program P into a set of possibilistic disjunctions C. Indeed, C can be obtained as
follows:
C :=
⋃
{(a1 ∨ . . . ∨ am∨ ∼ am+1 ∨ · · · ∨ ∼ aj ∨ aj+1 ∨ . . . , an α)|
(α : a1 ∨ . . . ∨ am ← am+1, . . . , aj , not aj+1, . . . , not an) ∈ P}
Let us remember that whenever a possibilistic program is considered as a possibilistic
theory, each negative literal not a is replaced by∼ a such that∼ is regarded as the negation
in classic logic — in Example 7, the transformation of a possibilistic program into a set of
possibilistic disjunctions is shown.
The following proposition shows that the resolution rule (R) is sound.
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Proposition 6
Let C be a set of possibilistic disjunctions, andC = (c α) be a possibilistic clause obtained
by a finite number of successive application of (R) to C; then C ⊢PL C.
Like the possibilistic rule introduced in (Dubois et al. 1994), (R) is complete for refuta-
tion. We will say that a possibilistic disjunctive program P is consistent if P has at least a
possibilistic answer set. Otherwise P is said to be inconsistent. The degree of inconsistency
of a possibilistic logic program P is Inc(P ) = GLB({α|Pα is consistent }).
Proposition 7
Let P be a set of possibilistic clauses and C be the set of possibilistic disjunctions obtained
fromP ; then the valuation of the optimal refutation by resolution from C is the inconsistent
degree of P .
The main implication of Proposition 6 and Proposition 7 is that (R) suggests a method
for inferring a possibilistic formula from a possibilistic knowledge base.
Corollary 1
Let P := 〈(Q,≤), N〉 be a possibilistic disjunctive logic program, ϕ be a literal and C be
a set of possibilistic disjunctions obtained from N ∪ {(∼ ϕ ⊤Q)}; then the valuation of
the optimal refutation from C is n(ϕ), that is P ⊢PL (ϕ n(ϕ)).
Based on the fact that the resolution rule (R) suggests a method for inferring the neces-
sity value of a possibilistic formula, we can define the following function for computing
the possibilistic answer sets of a possibilistic program P . In this function,  denotes an
empty clause.
Function Poss_Answer_Sets(P )
Let ASP (P ∗) be a function that computes the answer set models of the standard logic
program P ∗, for example DLV (DLV 1996).
Poss-ASP := ∅
For all S ∈ ASP (P ∗)
Let C be the set of possibilistic disjunctions obtained from PS .
S′ := ∅
for all a ∈ S
C′ := C ∪ {(∼ a ⊤Q)}
Search for a deduction of (R() α) by applying repeatedly
the resolution rule (R) from C′, with α maximal.
S′ := S′ ∪ {(a α)}
endfor
Poss-ASP := Poss-ASP ∪ S′
endfor
return(Poss-ASP).
The following proposition proves that the function Poss_Answer_Sets computes all
the possibilistic answer sets of a possibilistic logic program.
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Proposition 8
Let P := 〈(Q,≤), N〉 be a possibilistic logic program. The set Poss-ASP returned by
Poss_Answer_Sets(P ) is the set of all the possibilistic answer sets of P .
In order to illustrate this algorithm, let us consider the following example:
Example 7
Let P := 〈(Q,≤), N〉 be a possibilistic program such that Q := {0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, 1}, ≤
is the standard relation between rational numbers and N the following set of possibilistic
clauses:
0.7 : a ∨ b ← not c.
0.6 : c ← not a, not b.
0.8 : a ← b.
0.9 : e ← b.
0.6 : b ← a.
0.5 : b ← a.
First of all, we can see that P ∗ has two answer sets: S1 := {a, b, e} and S2 := {c}. This
means that P has two possibilistic answer set models. Let us consider S1 for our example.
Then, one can see that PS1 is:
0.7 : a ∨ b.
0.8 : a ← b.
0.9 : e ← b.
0.6 : b ← a.
0.5 : b ← a.
Then C := {(a∨b 0.7), (a∨ ∼ b 0.8), (e∨ ∼ b 0.9), (b∨ ∼ a 0.6), (b∨ ∼ a 0.5)}. In order
to infer the necessity value of the atom a, we add (∼ a 1) to C and a search for finding
an optimal refutation is applied. As we can see in Figure 3, there are three refutations,
however the optimal refutation is ( 0.7). This means that the best necessity value for the
atom a is 0.7.
(a v b 0.7) (a v ~b 0.8) (e v ~b 0.9) (b v ~a 0.6) (b v ~ a 0.5) (~ a 1)
(b 0.7)
(a 0.7)
(? 0.7)
(b 0.6)
(b 0.5)
(a 0.6)
(a 0.5)
(? 0.6) (? 0.5)
OPTIMAL
NON- OPTIMAL
NON-OPTIMAL
?
?
?
?
Fig. 3. Possibilistic resolution: Search for an optimal refutation for the atom a.
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In Figure 4, we can see the optimal refutation search for the atom b. As we can see the
optimal refutation is ( 0.6); hence the best necessity value for the atom b is 0.6.
?
? ?
(a v b 0.7) (a v ~b 0.8) (e v ~b 0.9) (b v ~a 0.6) (b v ~ a 0.5) (~ b 1)
(a 0.7)
(b 0.6)
(? 0.6)
(b 0.5)
(? 0.5)
OPTIMAL
NON-OPTIMAL
?
?
Fig. 4. Possibilistic resolution: Search for an optimal refutation for the atom b.
In Figure 5, we can see that the best necessity value for the atom e is 0.6.
?
? ?
?
?
(a v b 0.7) (a v ~b 0.8) (e v ~b 0.9) (b v ~a 0.6) (b v ~a 0.5) (~e 1)
(a 0.7)
(? 0.6)
(~a 0.6)
(~b 0.9)
(~a 0.5)
(? 0.5)
OPTIMAL
NON-OPTIMAL
Fig. 5. Possibilistic resolution: Search for an optimal refutation for the atom e.
Thought the search, we can infer that a possibilistic answer set of the program P is :
{(a, 0.7), (b, 0.6), (e, 0.6)}.
4.2 Possibilistic answer sets based on partial evaluation
We have defined a possibilistic answer set semantics by considering the formal proof the-
ory of possibilistic logic. However, in standard logic programming there are several frame-
works for analyzing, defining and computing logic programming semantics (Dix 1995a;
Dix 1995b). One of these approaches is based on program transformations, in fact there
are many studies on this approach, for example (Brass and Dix 1999; Brass and Dix 1997;
Brass and Dix 1998; Dix et al. 2001). For the case of disjunctive logic program, one im-
portant transformation is partial evaluation (also called unfolding) (Brass and Dix 1999).
This section shows that it is also possible to define a possibilistic disjunctive semantics
based on an operator which is a combination between partial evaluation for disjunctive
logic programs and the infer rule GMP ∗ of possibilistic logic. This semantics has the
same behavior as the semantics based on the proof theory of possibilistic logic.
This section starts by defining a version of the general principle of partial evaluation
(GPPE) for possibilistic positive disjunctive clauses.
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Definition 9 (Grade-GPPE (G-GPPE))
Let r1 be a possibilistic clause of the form α : A ← B+∪{B} and r2 a possibilistic clause
of the form α1 : A1 such that B ∈ A1 and B /∈ B+, then
G-GPPE(r1, r2) = (GLB({α, α1}) : A ∪ (A1 \ {B})← B+)
Observe that one of the possibilistic clauses which is considered by G-GPPE has an
empty body. For instance, let us consider the following two possibilistic clauses:
r1 = 0.7 : a ∨ b.
r2 = 0.9 : e← b.
Then G-GPPE(r1, r2) = (0.7 : e ∨ a). Now, by considering G-GPPE, we will define the
operator T .
Definition 10
Let P be a possibilistic positive logic program. The operator T is defined as follows:
T (P ) := P ∪ {G-GPPE(r1, r2)|r1, r2 ∈ P}
In order to illustrate the operator T , let us consider the program PS1 of Example 7.
0.7 : a ∨ b.
0.8 : a ← b.
0.9 : e ← b.
0.6 : b ← a.
0.5 : b ← a.
Hence, T (PS1) is:
0.7 : a ∨ b. 0.7 : a.
0.8 : a← b. 0.7 : e ∨ a.
0.9 : e← b. 0.6 : b.
0.6 : b← a. 0.5 : b.
0.5 : b← a.
Notice that by considering the possibilistic clauses that were added to PS1 by T , one can
reapply G-GPPE. For instance, if we consider 0.6 : b and 0.9 : e ← b from T (PS1),
G-GPPE infers 0.6 : e. Indeed, T (T (PS1)) is:
0.7 : a ∨ b. 0.7 : a. 0.6 : a.
0.8 : a← b. 0.7 : e ∨ a. 0.5 : a.
0.9 : e← b. 0.6 : b. 0.6 : e.
0.6 : b← a. 0.5 : b. 0.5 : e.
0.5 : b← a. 0.6 : b ∨ e.
0.5 : b ∨ e.
An important property of the operator T is that it always reaches a fixed-point.
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Proposition 9
Let P be a possibilistic disjunctive logic program. If Γ0 := T (P ) and Γi := T (Γi−1) such
that i ∈ N , then ∃ n ∈ N such that Γn = Γn−1. We denote Γn by Π(P ).
Let us consider again the possibilistic program PS1 . We can see that Π(PS1) is:
0.7 : a ∨ b. 0.7 : a. 0.6 : a. 0.6 a ∨ e.
0.8 : a← b. 0.7 : e ∨ a. 0.5 : a. 0.5 a ∨ e.
0.9 : e← b. 0.6 : b. 0.6 : e.
0.6 : b← a. 0.5 : b. 0.5 : e.
0.5 : b← a. 0.6 : b ∨ e.
0.5 : b ∨ e.
Observe that in Π(PS1) there are possibilistic facts (possibilistic clauses with empty
bodies and one atom in their heads) with different necessity value. In order to infer the
optimal necessity value of each possibilistic fact, one can consider the least upper bound
of these values. For instance, the optimal necessity value for the possibilistic atom a is
LUB({0.7, 0.6, 0.5}) = 0.7. Based on this idea, Semmin is defined as follows.
Definition 11
Let P be a possibilistic logic program and Facts(P, a) := {(α : a)|(α : a) ∈ P}.
Semmin(P ) := {(x, α)|Facts(P, x) 6= ∅ and α := LUB({n(r)|r ∈ Facts(P, x)})} in
which x ∈ LP .
It is easy to see that Semmin(Π(PS1)) is {(a, 0.7), (b, 0.6), (e, 0.6)}. Now by consid-
ering the operator T and Semmin, we can define a semantics for possibilistic disjunctive
logic programs that will be called possibilistic-T answer set semantics.
Definition 12
Let P be a possibilistic disjunctive logic program and M be a set of possibilistic atoms
such that M∗ is an answer set of P ∗. M is a possibilistic-T answer set of P if and only if
M = Semmin(Π(PM∗)).
In order to illustrate this definition, let us consider again the programP of Example 7 and
S = {(a, 0.7), (b, 0.6), (e, 0.6)}. As commented in Example 7, S∗ is an answer set of P ∗.
We have already seen that Semmin(Π(PS1 )) is {(a, 0.7), (b, 0.6), (e, 0.6)}, therefore we
can say that S is a possibilistic-T answer set of P . Observe that the possibilistic-T answer
set semantics and the possibilistic answer set semantics coincide. In fact, the following
proposition guarantees that both semantics are the same.
Proposition 10
Let P be a possibilistic disjunctive logic program and M a set of possibilistic atoms. M is
a possibilistic answer set of P if and only if M is a possibilistic-T answer set of P .
5 Inconsistency in possibilistic logic programs
In the first part of this section, the relevance of considering inconsistent possibilistic knowl-
edge bases is introduced, and in the second part, some criteria for managing inconsistent
possibilistic logic programs are introduced.
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5.1 Relevance of inconsistent possibilistic logic programs
Inconsistent knowledge bases are usually regarded as an epistemic hell that have to be
avoided at all costs. However, many times it is difficult or impossible to stay away from
managing inconsistent knowledge bases. There are authors such as Octávio Bueno (Bueno 2006)
who argues that the consideration of inconsistent systems is a useful device for a number of
reasons: (1) it is often the only way to explore inconsistent information without arbitrarily
rejecting precious data. (2) inconsistent systems are sometimes the only way to obtain new
information (particularly information that conflicts with deeply entrenched theories). As a
result, (3) inconsistent belief systems allow us to make better informed decisions regarding
which bits of information to accept or reject in the end.
In order to give a small example, in which exploring inconsistent information can be im-
portant for making a better informed decision, we will continue with the medical scenario
described in Section 1. In Example 4, we have already presented the grounded program
Pinfections of our medical scenario:
probable: r_inf(present, 1) ∨ no_r_inf(present, 1)← action(transplant, 0),
d_inf(present, 0).
confirmed: o(good_graft_funct, 1) ∨ o(delayed_graft_funct, 1)∨
o(terminal_insufficient_funct, 1)← action(transplant, 0).
confirmed: action(transplant, 0)← o(terminal_insufficient_funct, 0).
plausible: cs(stable, 1)← o(good_graft_funct, 1).
plausible: cs(unstable, 1)← o(delayed_graft_funct, 1).
plausible: cs(0-urgency, 1)← o(terminal_insufficient_funct, 1),
action(transplant, 0).
certain: ← action(transplant, 0), action(wait, 0).
certain: ← action(transplant, 0), cs(dead, 0).
certain: d_inf(present, 0).
certain: no_r_inf(present, 0).
certain: o(terminal_insufficient_funct, 0).
certain: cs(stable, 0).
As mentioned in Example 4, in this program the atoms ¬r_inf(present, 0) and
¬r_inf(present, 1) were replaced by no_r_inf(present, 0) and no_r_inf(present, 1)
respectively. Usually in standard answer set programming, the constraints
← no_r_inf(present, 0), r_inf(present, 0).
← no_r_inf(present, 1), no_r_inf(present, 1).
must be added to the program to avoid inconsistent answer sets. In order to illustrate the
role of these kinds of constraints, let C1 be the following possibilistic constraints:
certain: ← no_r_inf(present, 0), r_inf(present, 0).
certain: ← no_r_inf(present, 1), no_r_inf(present, 1).
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Also let us consider three new possibilistic clauses (denoted by Pv):
confirmed: v(kidney, 0)← cs(stable, 1), action(transplant, 0).
probable: no_v(kidney, 0)← r_inf(present, 1), action(transplant, 0).
certain: ← not cs(stable, 1).
The intended meaning of the predicate v(t, T ) is that the organ t is viable for a trans-
plant and T denotes a moment in time. Observe that we replaced the atom ¬v(kidney, 0)
with no_v(kidney, 0). The reading of the first clause is that if the clinical situation of the
organ recipient is stable after the graft, then it is confirmed that the kidney is viable for
transplant. The reading of the second one is that if the organ recipient is infected after
the graft, then it is plausible that the kidney is not viable for transplant. The aim of the
possibilistic constraint is to discard scenarios in which the clinical situation of the organ
recipient is not stable. Let us consider the respective possibilistic constraint w.r.t. the atoms
no_v(kidney, 0) and v(kidney, 0) (denoted by C2):
certain: ← no_v(kidney, 0), v(kidney, 0).
Two programs are defined:
P := Pinfections ∪ Pv and Pc := Pinfections ∪ Pv ∪ C1 ∪ C2
Basically, the difference between P and Pc is that P allows inconsistent possibilistic mod-
els and Pc does not allow inconsistent possibilistic models.
Now let us consider the possibilistic answer sets of the programs P and Pc. One can see
that the program Pc has just one possibilistic answer set:
{(d_inf(present, 0), certain), (no_r_inf(present, 0), certain),
(o(terminal_insufficient_funct, 0), certain), (cs(stable, 0), certain),
(action(transplant, 0), confirmed), (o(good_graft_funct, 1), confirmed),
(cs(stable,1), plausible), (no_r_inf(present,1), probable),
(v(kidney,0), plausible)}
This possibilistic answer set suggests that since it is plausible that the recipient’s clinical
situation will be stable after the graft, it is plausible that the kidney is viable for transplant-
ing. Observe that the possibilistic answer sets of P do not show the possibility that the
organ recipient could be infected after the graft.
Let us consider the possibilistic answer set of the program P :
S1 := {(d_inf(present, 0), certain), (no_r_inf(present, 0), certain),
(o(terminal_insufficient_funct, 0), certain), (cs(stable, 0), certain),
(action(transplant, 0), confirmed), (o(good_graft_funct, 1), confirmed),
(cs(stable,1), plausible), (no_r_inf(present,1), probable),
(v(kidney,0), plausible)}
S2 := {(d_inf(present, 0), certain), (no_r_inf(present, 0), certain),
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(o(terminal_insufficient_funct, 0), certain), (cs(stable, 0), certain),
(action(transplant, 0), confirmed), (o(good_graft_funct, 1), confirmed),
(cs(stable,1), plausible), (r_inf(present,1), probable),
(v(kidney,0), plausible), (no_v(kidney,0), probable)}
P has two possibilistic answer sets: S1 and S2. S1 corresponds to the possibilistic answer
set of the program Pc and S2 is an inconsistent possibilistic answer set — because the
atoms (v(kidney,0), plausible) and (no_v(kidney,0), probable) appear in S2. Observe that
although S2 is an inconsistent possibilistic answer set, it contains important information
w.r.t. the considerations of our scenario. S2 suggests that even though it is plausible that
the clinical situation of the organ recipient will be stable after the graft, it is also probable
that the organ recipient will be infected by the infection of the donor’s organ.
Observe that Pc is unable to infer the possibilistic answer set S2; because, it contains the
following possibilistic constraint:
certain: ← no_v(kidney, 0), v(kidney, 0).
By defining these kinds of constraints, we can guarantee that any possibilistic answer set
inferred from Pc will be consistent; however, one can omit important considerations w.r.t.
a decision-making problem. In fact, we agree with Bueno (Bueno 2006) that considering
inconsistent systems as inconsistent possibilistic answer sets is some times the only way to
explore inconsistent information without arbitrarily rejecting precious data.
5.2 Inconsistency degrees of possibilistic sets
To manage inconsistent possibilistic answer sets, it is necessary to define a criterion of
preference between possibilistic answer sets. In order to define a criterion between possi-
bilistic answer sets, the concept of inconsistency degree of a possibilistic set is defined. We
say that a set of possibilistic atoms S is inconsistent (resp. consistent) if and only if S∗ is
inconsistent (resp. consistent), that is to say there is an atom a such that a,¬a ∈ S∗.
Definition 13
Let A ∈ SP . The inconsistent degree of S is defined as follows:
InconsDegre(S) :=
{
⊥Q if S∗ is consistent
GLB({α|Sα is consistent}) otherwise
in which ⊥Q is the bottom of the lattice (Q,≤) and Sα := {(a, α1) ∈ S|α1 ≥ α}.
For instance, the possibilistic answer set S2 of our example above has a degree of incon-
sistency of confirmed. Based on the degree of inconsistency of possibilistic sets, we can
define a criterion of preference between possibilistic answer sets.
Definition 14
Let P = 〈(Q,≤), N〉 be a possibilistic program and M1, M2 two possibilistic answer sets
of P . We say that M1 is more-consistent than M2 if and only if InconsDegre(M1) <
InconsDegre(M2).
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In our example above, it is obvious that S1 is more-consistent than S2. In general terms,
a possibilistic answer set M1 is preferred to M2 if and only if M1 is more-consistent
than M2. This means that any consistent possibilistic answer set will be preferred to any
inconsistent possibilistic answer set.
So far we have commented only on the case of inconsistent possibilistic answer sets.
However, there are possibilistic programs that are inconsistent because they have no possi-
bilistic answer sets. For instance, let us consider the following possibilistic program Pinc
(we are assuming the lattice of Example 7):
0.3 : a← not b.
0.5 : b← not c.
0.6 : c← not a.
Observe that P ∗inc has no answer sets; hence, Pinc has no possibilistic answer sets.
5.3 Restoring inconsistent possibilistic knowledge bases
In order to restore consistency of an inconsistent possibilistic knowledge base, possi-
bilistic logic eliminates the set of possibilistic formulæ which are lower than the incon-
sistent degree of the inconsistent knowledge base. Considering this idea, the authors of
(Nicolas et al. 2006) defined the concept of α-cut for possibilistic logic programs. Based
on Definition 14 of (Nicolas et al. 2006), we define its respective generalization for our
approach.
Definition 15
Let P be a possibilistic logic program
- the strict α-cut is the subprogram P>α = {r ∈ P |n(r) > α}
- the consistency cut degree of P :
ConsCutDeg(P ) :=
{
⊥Q if P ∗ is consistent
GLB({α|Pα is consistent}) otherwise
where ⊥Q is the bottom of the lattice (Q,≤).
Notice that the consistency cut degree of a possibilistic logic program identifies the
minimum level of certainty for which a strict α-cut of P is consistent. As Nicolas et al., re-
marked in (Nicolas et al. 2006), by the non-monotonicity of the framework, it is not certain
that a higher cut is necessarily consistent.
In order to illustrate these ideas, let us reconsider the program Pinc. First, one can see
that ConsCutDeg(Pinc) = 0.3; hence, the subprogram PConsCutDeg(Pinc) is:
0.5 : b← not c.
0.6 : c← not a.
Observe that this program has a possibilistic answer set which is {(c, 0.6)}. Hence due to
the strict α-cut of P , one is able to infer information from Pinc
To resume, one can identify two kinds of inconsistencies in our approach,
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• one which arises from the presence of complementary atoms in a possibilistic answer
set and
• one which arises from the non-existence of a possibilistic answer set of a possibilistic
logic program.
To manage the inconsistency of possibilistic answer sets, a criterion of preference between
possibilistic answer sets was defined. On the other hand, to manage the non-existence of
a possibilistic answer set of a possibilistic logic program P , the approach suggested by
Nicolas et al. in (Nicolas et al. 2006), was adopted. This approach is based on α-cuts in
order to get consistent subprograms of a given program P .
6 Related Work
Research on logic programming with uncertainty has dealt with various approaches of
logic programming semantics, as well as different applications. Most of the approaches in
the literature employ one of the following formalisms:
• annotated logic programming, e.g. (Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992).
• probabilistic logic, e.g. (Ng and Subrahmanian 1992; Lukasiewicz 1998; Kern-Isberner and Lukasiewicz 2004;
Baral et al. 2009).
• fuzzy set theory, e.g. (van Emden 1986; Rodríguez-Artalejo and Romero-Díaz 2008;
Van-Nieuwenborgh et al. 2007).
• multi-valued logic, e.g. (Fitting 1991; Lakshmanan 1994).
• evidence theoretic logic programming, e.g. (Baldwin 1987).
• possibilistic logic, e.g. (Dubois et al. 1991; Alsinet and Godo 2002; Alsinet and Godo 2000;
Alsinet et al. 2008; Nicolas et al. 2006).
Basically, these approaches differ in the underlying notion of uncertainty and how un-
certainty values, associated with clauses and facts, are managed. Among these approaches,
the formalisms based on possibilistic logic are closely related to the approach presented in
this paper. A clear distinction betweem them and the formalism of this paper is that none
of them capture disjunctive clauses. On the other hand, excepting the work of Nicolas, et
al., (Nicolas et al. 2006), none of these approaches describe a formalism for dealing with
uncertainty in a logic program with default negation by means of possibilistic logic. Let us
recall that the work of (Nicolas et al. 2006) is totally captured by the formalism presented
in this paper (Proposition 5), but not directly vice versa. For instance, let us consider the
possibilistic logic programs P = 〈({0.1, . . . , 0.9},≤), N〉 such that ≤ is the standard re-
lation between rational number and N the following set of possibilistic clauses:
0.5 : a ∨ b. 0.5 : a← b.
0.5 : b← a.
By considering a standard transformation from disjunctive clauses to normal clauses (Baral 2003),
this program can be transformed to the possibilistic normal logic programs P ′:
0.5 : a← not b. 0.5 : a← b.
0.5 : b← not a. 0.5 : b← a.
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One can see that P has a possibilistic answer set: {(a, 0.5), (b, 0.5)}; however, P ′ has no
possibilistic answer sets.
Even though, one can find a wide range of formalisms for dealing with uncertainty by
using normal logic programs, there are few proposals for dealing with uncertainty by us-
ing disjunctive logic programs (Lukasiewicz 2001; Gergatsoulis et al. 2001; Mateis 2000;
Baral et al. 2009):
• In (Lukasiewicz 2001), Many-Valued Disjunctive Logic Programs with probabilis-
tic semantics are introduced. In this approach, probabilistic values are associated
with each clause. Like our approach, Lukasiewicz considers partial evaluation for
characterizing different semantics by means of probabilistic theory.
• In (Gergatsoulis et al. 2001), the logic programming language Disjunctive Chronolog
is introduced. This approach combines temporal and disjunctive logic programming.
Disjunctive Chronolog is capable of expressing dynamic behaviour as well as uncer-
tainty. In this approach, like our semantics, it is shown that logic semantics of these
programs can be characterized by a fixed- point semantics.
• In (Mateis 2000), the Quantitative Disjunctive Logic Programs (QDLP) are intro-
duced. These programs associate an reliability interval with each clause. Different
triangular norms (T-norms) are employed to define calculi for propagating uncer-
tainty information from the premises to the conclusion of a quantitative rule; hence,
the semantics of these programs is parameterized. This means that each choice of a
T-norm induces different QDLP languages.
• In (Baral et al. 2009), intensive research is done in order to achieve a complete inte-
gration between ASP and probability theory. This approach is similar to the approach
presented in this paper; but it is in the context of probabilistic theory.
We want to point out that the syntactic approach of this paper is motivated by the fact
that the possibilistic logic is axiomatizable; therefore, a proof theory approach (axioms and
inference rules) leads to constructions of a possibilistic semantics such as a logic inference.
This kind of possibilistic framework allows us to explore extensions of the possibilistic an-
swer set semantics by considering the inference of different logics. In fact, by considering
a syntactic approach, one can explore properties such as strong equivalence and free-syntax
programs. This means that the exploration of a syntactic approach leads to important im-
plications such as the implications of an approach based on interpretations and possibilistic
distributions.
The consideration of axiomatizations of given logics has shown to be a generic approach
for characterizing logic programming semantics. For instance, the answer set semantics
inference can be characterized as a logic inference in terms of the proof theory of intu-
itionistic logic and intermediate logics (Pearce 1999; Osorio et al. 2004).
7 Conclusions and future work
At the beginning of this research, two main goals were expected to be achieved: 1.- a pos-
sibilistic extension of the answer set programming paradigm for leading with uncertain,
inconsistent and incomplete information; and, 2.- exploring the axiomatization of possi-
bilistic logic in order to define a computable possibilistic disjunctive semantics.
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In order to achieve the first goal, the work presented in (Nicolas et al. 2006) was taken as
a reference point. Unlike the approach of (Nicolas et al. 2006), which is restricted to pos-
sibilistic normal programs, we define a possibilistic logic programming framework based
on possibilistic disjunctive logic programs. Our approach introduces the use of possibilistic
disjunctive clauses which are able to capture incomplete information and incomplete states
of a knowledge base at the same time.
For capturing the semantics of possibilistic disjunctive logic programs, the axiomatiza-
tion of possibilistic logic and the standard definition of the answer set semantics are taken
as a base. Given that the inference of possibilistic logic is characterized by a possibilistic
resolution rule (Proposition 6), it is shown that:
1. The optimal certainty value of an atom which belongs to a possibilistic answer
set corresponds to the optimal refutation by possibilistic resolution (Proposition 7);
hence,
2. There exists an algorithm for computing the possibilistic answer sets of a possibilis-
tic disjunctive logic program (Proposition 8).
As an alternative approach for inferring the possibilistic answer set semantics, it is shown
that this semantics can be characterized by a simplified version of the principle of partial
evaluation. This means that the possibilistic answer set semantics is characterized by a
possibilistic fixed-point operator (Proposition 10). This result gives two points of view for
constructing the possibilistic answer set semantics in terms of two syntactic processes (i.e.,
the possibilistic proof theory and the principle of partial evaluation).
Based on the flexibility of possibilistic logic for defining degrees of uncertainty, it is
shown that non-numerical degrees for capturing uncertain information can be captured by
the defined possibilistic answer set semantics. This is illustrated in a medical scenario.
To manage the inconsistency of possibilistic models, we have defined a criterion of pref-
erence between possibilistic answer sets. Also, to manage the non-existence of possibilistic
answer set of a possibilistic logic program P , we have adopted the approach suggested by
Nicolas et al. in (Nicolas et al. 2006) of cuts for achieving consistent subprograms of P .
In future work, there are several topics which will be explored. One of the main topics to
explore is to show that the possibilistic answer set semantics can be characterized as a logic
inference in terms of a possibilistic version of the intuitionistic logic. This issue is moti-
vated by the fact that the answer set semantic inference can be characterized as a logic in-
ference in terms of intuitionistic logic (Pearce 1999; Osorio et al. 2004). On the other hand,
we have been exploring to define a possibilistic action language. In (Nieves et al. 2007), we
have already defined our first ideas in the context of the action languageA. Finally, we have
started to explore the definition of a possibilistic framework in order to define preference
between rules and preferences between atoms. With this objective in mind, possibilistic
ordered disjunction programs have been explored (Confalonieri et al. 2010).
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Appendix: Proofs
In this appendix, we give the proofs of some results presented in this paper.
Proposition 2 Let P = 〈(Q,≤), N〉 be a possibilistic disjunctive logic program and
M1,M2 ∈ PS such that M∗1 = M∗2 . If P PL M1 and P PL M2, then P PL
M1 ⊔M2.
Proof
The proof is straightforward.
Proposition 3 Let P be a possibilistic disjunctive logic program. If M is a possibilistic
answer set of P then M∗ is an answer set of P ∗.
Proof
The proof is straightforward by the possibilistic answer set’s definition.
Proposition 4 Let P = 〈(Q,≤), N〉 be a possibilistic disjunctive logic program and α
be a fixed element of Q. If ∀r ∈ P , n(r) = α and M ′ is an answer set of P ∗, then
M := {(a, α)|a ∈M ′} is a possibilistic answer set of P .
Proof
Let us introduce two observations:
1. We known that ∀r ∈ P , n(r) = α; hence, if P ⊢PL (a, α′), then α′ = α. This statement
can be proved by contradiction.
2. Given a set of atoms S, if ∀r ∈ P , n(r) = α then ∀r ∈ PS , n(r) = α. This statement
follows by fact that the reduction PS (Definition 6) does not affect n(r) of clause rule r in
P .
As premises we know that ∀r ∈ P , n(r) = α and M ′ is an answer set of P ∗; hence, let
M := {(a, α)|a ∈M ′}. Hence, we will prove that M is a possibilistic answer set of P .
If M ′ is an answer set of P ∗, then ∀a ∈ M ′, ∃α′ ∈ Q such that PM ′ ⊢PL (a, α′).
Therefore, by observations 1 and 2, ∀a ∈ M ′, PM ′ ⊢PL (a, α). Then, P PL M .
Observe that M is a greatest set in PS, hence, since P PL M and M is a greatest
set, M is a possibilistic answer set of P .
Proposition 5 Let P := 〈(Q,≤), N〉 be a possibilistic normal program such that (Q,≤)
is a totally ordered set and LP has no extended atoms. M is a possibilistic answer set of P
if and only if M is a possibilistic stable model of P .
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Proof
(Sketch) It is not difficult to see that when P is a possibilistic normal program, then
the syntactic reduction of Definition 6 and the syntactic reduction of Definition 10 from
(Nicolas et al. 2006) coincide. Then the proof is reduced to possibilistic definite programs.
But, this case is straightforward, since essentially GMP is applied for inferring the possi-
bilistic models of the program in both approaches.
Proposition 6 Let C be a set of possibilistic disjunctions, and C = (c α) be a possibilistic
clause obtained by a finite number of successive application of (R) to C; then C ⊢PL C.
Proof
(The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.8.2 of (Dubois et al. 1994)) Let us con-
sider two possibilistic clauses: C1 = (c1 α1) and C2 = (c2 α2), the application of R
yields C′ = (R(c1, c2) GLB({α1, α2})). By classic logic, we known that R(c1, c2) is
sound; hence the key point of the proof is to show that n(R(c1, c2)) ≥ GLB({α1, α2}).
By definition of necessity-valued clause, n(c1) ≥ α1 and n(c2) ≥ α2, then n(c1∧c2) =
GLB({n(c1), n(c2)}) ≥ GLB({α1, α2}). Since c1∧c2 ⊢C R(c1, c2), then n(R(c1, c2)) ≥
n(c1∧c2) (because ifϕ ⊢PL ψ thenN(ψ) ≥ N(ϕ)). Thusn(R(c1, c2)) ≥ GLB({α1, α2});
therefore (R) is sound. Then by induction any possibilistic formula inferred by a finite num-
ber of successive applications of (R) to C is a logical consequence of C.
Proposition 7 Let P be a set of possibilistic clauses and C be the set of possibilistic
disjunctions obtained from P ; then the valuation of the optimal refutation by resolution
from C is the inconsistent degree of P .
Proof
(The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.8.3 of (Dubois et al. 1994)) By possi-
bilistic logic, we know that C ⊢PL (⊥ α) if and only if (Cα)∗ is inconsistent in the sense
of classic logic. Since (R) is complete in classic logic, then there exists a refutation R()
from (Cα)∗. Thus considering the valuation of the refutation R(), we obtain a refuta-
tion from Cα such that n(R()) ≥ α. Then n(R()) ≥ Inc(C). Since (R) is sound then
n(R()) cannot be strictly greater than Inc(C). Thus n(R()) is equal to Inc(C). Ac-
cording to Proposition 3.8.1 of (Dubois et al. 1994), Inc(C) = Inc(P ), thus n(R()) is
also equal to Inc(P ).
Proposition 8 Let P := 〈(Q,≤), N〉 be a possibilistic logic program. The set Poss-ASP
returned by Poss_Answer_Sets(P ) is the set of all the possibilistic answer sets of P .
Proof
The result follows from the following facts:
1. The function ASP computes all the answer set of P ∗.
2. If M is a possibilistic answer set of P iff M∗ is an answer set of P ∗ (Proposition 3).
3. By Corollary 1, we know that the possibilistic resolution rule R is sound and complete for
computing optimal possibilistic degrees.
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Proposition 9 Let P be a possibilistic disjunctive logic program. If Γ0 := T (P ) and
Γi := T (Γi−1) such that i ∈ N , then ∃ n ∈ N such that Γn = Γn−1. We denote Γn by
Π(P ).
Proof
It is not difficult to see that the operator T is monotonic, then the proof is direct by Tarski’s
Lattice-Theoretical Fixpoint Theorem (Tarski 1955).
Proposition 10 Let P be a possibilistic disjunctive logic program and M a set of possi-
bilistic atoms. M is a possibilistic answer set of P if and only if M is a possibilistic-T
answer set of P .
Proof
Two observations:
1. By definition, it is straightforward that if M1 is a possibilistic answer set of P , then there
exists a possibilistic-T answer set M2 of P such that M∗1 =M∗2 and viceversa.
2. Since G-GPPE can be regarded as a macro of the possibilistic rule (R), we can conclude
by Proposition 6 that G-GPPE is sound.
Let M1 be a possibilistic answer set of P and M2 be a possibilistic-T answer set of
P . By Observation 1, the central point of the proof is to prove that if (a, α1) ∈ M1 and
(a, α2) ∈M2 such that M∗1 =M∗2 , then α1 = α2.
The proof is by contradiction. Let us suppose that (a, α1) ∈M1 and (a, α2) ∈M2 such
that M∗1 =M∗2 and α1 6= α2. Then there are two cases α1 < α2 or α1 > α2
α1 < α2 : Since G-GPPE is sound (Observation 2), then α1 is not the optimal necessity-
value for the atom a, but this is false by Corollary 1.
α1 > α2 : If α1 > α2 then there exists a possibilistic claus α1 : A ← B+ ∈ P (M1)
∗
that
belongs to the optimal refutation of the atom a and it was not reduced by G-GPPE. But
this is false because G-GPPE is a macro of the resolution rule (R).
